我系蒋运鹏副教授在国际期刊发表论文

导语

我系长聘副教授蒋运鹏老师在 British Journal for the History of Philosophy 期刊2018年第26卷第2期上发表论文 "Conceiving existence: on Humes argument against the distinctness of the idea of existence"

 

内容简介

 

在近代早期,即1718世纪,观念(idea)在各个哲学理论领域中扮演着最核心的角色。因此,这个时期关于存在概念的理论,一般就是关于存在观念(idea)的理论。在英国经验主义的三个代表人物(洛克、休谟和贝克莱)之中,唯有休谟在其著述的显著位置专门探讨了存在观念。在《人性论》之中,他用整整一个小节来论证,并没有一个独立的观念专门反映存在性质(existential quality)。他所论证的观点,我们简称T

 

但是,迄今为止,我们在研究文献中并不能找到令人满意的论述,告诉我们休谟究竟是如何论证T的。所有目前为止对休谟论证的相关重构,都使用了一些在阐释上很难立足的预设。本文的目的,是提供一种对该论证更好的重构。鉴于存在理论是休谟形而上学的核心组成部分,此项重构工作也能帮助我们更好地洞察休谟理论哲学内部的脉络。

 

另一方面,许多阐释者认为T蕴含一些特定的认知或形而上学后果,而这些后果是休谟本人无法接受的。比如,有人认为,T将使得我们无法思考否定的存在命题。本文的另一个目的,是证明T并不蕴含这个不受欢迎的后果。本文这一部分内容,与当代形而上学中关于否定存在命题的理论密切相关。

 

摘要

 

There are two questions concerning Humes doctrine of existence which have not yet found any persuasive answer: (a) What is his argument in favour of the thesis that there is no distinct idea of existence? (b) What are the semantic and metaphysical consequences of this thesis within his philosophical framework? This paper mainly aims to answer question (a). In order to do that, I will first explain why some reconstructions suggested by interpreters such as Cummins and Bricke are problematic. One of them relies on exegetically dubious presumptions; the other departs too much from Humes text. Then, I will offer my own reconstruction that makes maximal use of some principles which are very familiar to Humes readers, including the principle stating the similarity between perceptions and their images. After that, I will discuss a potential objection to my reconstruction and make a brief remark on question (b), arguing that, as opposed to numerous interpreters concerns, Humes thesis that there is no distinct idea of existence does not by itself prevent him from being able to conceive negative existential propositions.

 

KEYWORDS: Hume, existence, idea, separability

 

To cite this article: Asher Jiang (2018) Conceiving existence: on Humes argument against thedistinctness of the idea of existence, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 26:2, 297-316,DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2017.1413538 

To link to this article:https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2017.1413538